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    <title>Tcp on Daniel &#39;f0o&#39; Preussker</title>
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      <title>Exploiting TCP Handshake Quirks for IP Verification</title>
      <link>https://f0o.dev/research/2026/04/exploiting-tcp-handshake-quirks-for-ip-verification/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://f0o.dev/research/2026/04/exploiting-tcp-handshake-quirks-for-ip-verification/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;It&amp;rsquo;s an incredibly frustrating reality that we&amp;rsquo;re still battling TCP SYN Floods with spoofed IPs in 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ISPs completely ignoring BCP38 is a rant for another day. Right now, I want to talk about how we can actually solve the problem using a beautiful quirk in the TCP stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The core concept relies entirely on how operating systems handle unexpected ACK numbers, and how we can weaponize that behavior for defensive purposes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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